Storing highly confidential data and carrying out security-related operations are crucial to many systems. Starting from an industrial use case we propose a generic architecture based on secret sharing which address critical operation authorization. By comparing and benchmarking different scheme from the literature we analyze the different trade-offs (security, functionality, performance) which can be achieved. Finally by providing an open source .NET implementation of several secret sharing schemes, this paper aims to rise awareness regarding the capabilities of such algorithms to increase security in industrial setting.
INTRODUCTION
Storing highly confidential and sensitive data, such as encryption keys, is a challenging task. Understandably, any accidental or other incidental disclosure of these classified data could be catastrophic. However, counting on a single copy of a secret increases the risk of losing data in case of failure. On the other hand, preserving multiple copies of a secret increases resilience to failures, while it downgrades security, because it widens the attack surface and thus increases the probability of secret exposure. Consequently, there is a trade-off between resilience to failure and preserving confidentiality.
One way to address this problem is to use secret sharing (Shamir, 1979; Benaloh and Leichter, 1990; Blakley et al., 1979; Schoenmakers, 1999; Feldman, 1987) . This technique offers redundancy by splitting the secret in a way that each share on its own carries no information about the actual secret. At the same time, certain authorized sets of these copies would, together, reveal the secret. This approach makes the secret recoverable when confronting disasters, while at the same time, it does not increase the risk of secret leakage. Compared to the classic approach in which a single mistake causes secret exposure, this technique can tolerate multiple breaches.
Likewise, there exist security-related operations that are so critical for a system, that resemble the situation of highly confidential data. Such operations inevitably require redundancy (multiple users could carry them out) and security (guarantees that no misuse could occur). For instance, altering the system wide security policies should be considered as a critical operation. In this case, overly trusting multiple users (say admins) to perform such operations increases the risk of insider attacks. At the same time, paranoid settings such as only enabling a single super trusted user to perform highly critical operations may result in availability issues.
Therefore, one way to deal with the authorization of security-related operations is to require the agreement of multiple users (similar to the four eyes principle) before the operations can be carried out. Such setting lowers the likelihood of misuse by single users, and increases the availability of the system. Problem: In this paper, we conduct a case study that is inspired by Brainloop, a secure cloud storage provider for document collaboration. For their commercial solution, they use symmetric encryption with different keys for each client. In addition to that, their cloud storage offers document processing and collaboration features. Thus, their servers need to access all encryption keys on demand. However, these keys are encrypted with another key, known as the master key (a 256 bit AES key).
On the one hand, loss or damage of the master key is disastrous, since it leaves all clients with no possibility to recover their data. On the other hand, Brainloop considers altering the master key and changing hardware configuration as critical operations, which are only permitted after agreement of all the trusted 446 parties. It means that if such incidents occur, the system stops functioning until the parties approve the changes. Therefore, it is desired to let an authentic subgroup of trusted parties to approve the legitimacy of a critical operation. This subgroup could be for instance any k persons out of all n participants or even an arbitrary subset of the trusted parties, e.g. a welldefined subset, such as (party 1 and party 2 ) or (party 3 and party 4 ). Brainloop's use case clearly resembles the secret sharing scenario.
Proposed Solution: Our proposed solution combines these two separate requirements via the use of secret sharing. The core idea is to set an authentication framework, based on a token shared among several trust parties via secret sharing. A critical operation is authorized if the trust parties are authenticated in this framework, i.e. if the system is able to reconstruct the token from the shares sent by the trust parties. Additionally this token consists in the most valuable information which is best protected against malicious admin (either in or out of the system) and for which there is redundancy need. This way we achieve: a) redundancy of the most secret data, without enlarging the attack surface and b) in order for a malicious admin to run a critical operation, he would have to obtain first the most secret data, which is either not in the system or in the most secure place (e.g. secured by means of orthogonal technology such as trusted computing (Garfinkel et al., 2003; Santos et al., 2009; Neisse et al., 2011) ).
Implementing our Approach: Having distributively secure shares and flexibility in defining security parameters makes secret sharing a potentially good solution for Brainloop's problem. However, the effectiveness and applicability of various schemes to realistic use cases (i.e., Brainloop) are vague. Similarly, the trade offs between security features and performance with real world parameters (when number of parties increase) have not been thoroughly studied in practice. Therefore, as part of our contribution, we explore the most prominent schemes from the literature, study their applicability to our use case and discuss the trade offs, as a guideline for future applications.
Additionally, we provide an open source implementation for the selected schemes, in order to foster the adaptability of our solution. For instance, standard libraries of two popular software development frameworks (Microsoft .Net version 4.5 and Java version 8.0) have not implemented secret sharing schemes, which make it difficult for practitioners to adopt them or experiment with them.
We use our library to evaluate performance of various different schemes with reasonable parameters for an authorization system. These implementations serve as guideline to practitioners to choose an acceptable security vs. performance trade off. Summarizing:
Contributions: a) Starting from an industrial use case, we propose an architecture, based on secret sharing as a building block, for enforcing multi-user agreement as well as secret data redundancy b) we study the applicability of the most prominent schemes in the secret sharing research: (Shamir, 1979) , Generalized Access Structure (Benaloh and Leichter, 1990) and (Schoenmakers, 1999) to our critical operation authorization system (i.e Brainloop) c) we study the efficiency of these schemes with real world parameters d) we provide an open source implementation for the aforementioned secret sharing schemes.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Preliminaries on secret sharing in Section 2 are discussed. Then we describe details of our authorization system and present benchmarks in Section 3. In Section 4 we review Brainloop's case study and apply our authorization system to it. Later, we discuss in Section 5 our benchmark results and shed light on applicability of the implemented schemes in real world problems . We review related works in Section 6. Lastly, we conclude in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES
Secret sharing is a technique in which a dealer securely divides a secret among a group of players (participants). Later, the secret can only be reconstructed if an authentic subset of participants agree on providing their possessed shares, otherwise it remains uncomputable. Since the seminal work of Shamir and Blakley (Blakley et al., 1979) , many secret sharing schemes were designed. Based on the main feature, we roughly categorize secret sharing schemes into three subcategories.
Threshold Schemes. This group of schemes divides a secret among n parties, and enables k, 0 < k ≤ n, of them to compute the secret. Also, they are the most optimal in terms of execution time and (short) share length. For instance, (Shamir, 1979 ) is a threshold scheme. Nevertheless, these schemes are not so flexible in terms of handling more complex use cases.
Generalized Access Structures. These schemes allow for full customization in determining authentic sets. For example, one can take into account parties' roles and/or department in the share distribution and secret reconstruction. A particular business usecase may require shares from at least one member of department A and one member of department B to re-cover the secret. Hence, they are flexible enough to handle all complex business requirements. (Benaloh and Leichter, 1990 ) is a scheme that realizes generalized access structures.
Verifiable Schemes. Beside typical sharing and reconstruction operations, these schemes provide a mathematical guarantee that the shares are consistent. In exact words, players and the dealer can verify the integrity of the shares on demand. For example, (Feldman, 1987; Schoenmakers, 1999) are samples of verifiable schemes.
In this paper, we opt for the secret sharing schemes which we view as the most prominent within each category. Shamir as a candidate for threshold schemes, Benaloh-Leichter for generalized access structure and finally Schoenmakers as verifiable secret sharing scheme. These schemes are selected for further implementation and performance analysis. Due to space constraints, we refer the reader to (Shamir, 1979; Benaloh and Leichter, 1990; Schoenmakers, 1999) for the schemes' details.
IMPLEMENTATION AND BENCHMARKS
Employing secret sharing schemes in the industrial context requires mindful identification of certain unavoidable trade-offs. In other words, we need to thoroughly find out the efficiency compromises one has to make for a particular security (integrity check, encryption and collusion) or functional (threshold vs. non-threshold) feature. This also supports our case study by shedding light on the performance differences.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no publicly available implementation for most of the secret sharing schemes discussed previously in modern programming languages such as Java and .NET. Not only does this make difficult to decide whether certain trade-offs are acceptable in practice (although there are some published benchmarks in the literature (DSouza et al., 2011) and complexity-theoretical bounds are known (Beimel, 2011) ), but ultimately, it makes it very hard for practitioners to actually integrate secret sharing into their solutions, since they would have to implement the algorithms themselves. This is a daunting task, since it requires a non-trivial cryptography background and additional cost and effort. Therefore, as a first contribution, and in order to derive concrete performance bounds, we implemented * Shamir, Benaloh-Leichter and Schoenmak- * available at (Ahmadvand, 2015) ers in .NET † (which is the standard used by Brainloop).
Benchmarks
To choose the appropriate scheme for our case study, runtime performance plays an important role. As mentioned earlier complexity-theoretical bounds for the practitioner are helpful but insufficient. Plus we need concrete implementations (for system integration) which to the best of our knowledge for some schemes are not publicly available. Therefore, we implemented all three reviewed schemes and performed benchmarks on a Windows 7 computer with the following configuration: Intel core i5 processor and 8 GB memory. The key sizes of 128, 256 and 512 bits were used in the experiment of the Shamir and Benaloh-Leichter scheme. For Schoenmakers, since the scheme security relies on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem, we evaluated our implementation with 1024 and 2048 bit fields, which are known to be secure to handle 128 bit and 256 bit keys (BSI, 2015) .
The main operations Share Generation, Secret Reconstruction and Share Verification (only for Schoenmakers) operations have undergone experiments for the keys sized 128, 256 bits. Each operation is iterated 100 times to find a reliable performance. To filter out random prime generation noises from our evaluation, we generate 1000 prime numbers per each field size, later, at the execution time, we randomly choose an element from the prepared list. We show mean average diagrams for various key sizes. The performance results are depicted in Figures 1 to 3. 
Brainloop CASE STUDY
Background.
Brainloop provides a secure SaaS storage and collaboration platform. Data are stored encrypted with an AES key specific to each client. In order for the system to provide collaborative features, those AES keys are stored in a DB, encrypted with another AES key known as the master key. This master key is the most important key. It ensures (directly and indirectly) the security of all user data. So on the one hand, it is very important not to lose it, on the other hand no malicious person (including a malicious administrator) should have access to it. To prevent its loss (due to defective hardware) the master key is split into chunks and distributed to various trust † to accelerate our implementation we are using the (C language) NTL library which is an open source number theory library (Shoup, 2016) . parties a.k.a VIPs * . The ownership of the master key chunks is also used within system workflows in which VIPs must agree on before starting critical operations. The importance of these operations prohibits administrators from starting them.
The first critical operation which requires VIPs' agreement is changing the master key, since any cryp- * C-level people of Brainloop tographic key should be periodically rotated. Once the master key is changed it needs to be re-distributed to selected VIPs and of course administrators should not be able to control this action (and to which individuals the key parts are sent). The other critical operation is when hardware needs to be changed. In order to prevent a malicious hardware replacement, a hardware fingerprint is stored (encrypted) in the system and regularly checked. If a fingerprint mismatch happens there are two possibilities: either the hardware is broken and needs to be changed, or a malicious person tried to changed it. When a mismatch occurs the system turns into a "failed state" and the VIPs need to "agree" in order to reset the system back to the "normal state".
For these two critical operations, the VIPs agree in that they upload (securely) their key parts to the system. The system accepts this "agreement" if it is able to reconstruct the master key from the different key parts. This architecture relates the most valuable data with the ability to start the most critical operations, however it has two drawbacks: on the one hand, the VIPs get to know a part of the master key, so if 2 out 3 VIPs were malicious they could collude and recover 2/3 of the master key, which lets the last third open to brute-force. On the other hand, all the VIPs must be present to start a critical operation, this is not convenient at all considering that a hardware failure can happen any time and the system needs to be recovered as soon as possible.
Solution. By using secret sharing in this context it is possible to improve both the overall security and Enhancing Operation Security using Secret Sharing flexibility of the system. Indeed, by giving shares (using secret sharing) and not parts of the master key, the VIP can still perform the agreement process, but without knowing a part of the key. Moreover, they do not need all to be present and upload the key parts in case of critical operations.
Note that the master key is meant to be accessible by the server at any time. This may raise the concern about its security when confronting malicious host administrators. We believe this protection (against an admin) is an orthogonal problem that requires a set of security policy enforcements at various levels, including operation, infrastructure and software (Haldar et al., 2004; Garfinkel et al., 2003; Neisse et al., 2011; Rocha and Correia, 2011; Santos et al., 2009; Chou, 2013; Rocha et al., 2013) . Therefore, the rogue insider threat is excluded from our case study. Following this study, the solution was implemented in Brainloop product.
DISCUSSION
Our benchmark results indicate that the collusionprevention security feature alone does not have performance drawbacks. However, handling nonthreshold use cases using Benaloh-Leichter grows exponentially in the number of parties in the worst case. Furthermore, supporting share integrity verifiability along with encryption, which is offered by the Schoenmakers algorithm, slowed the runtime execution into the order of seconds with upper bound of 25 seconds when n = 100 and k = 60. Thus, for a given context, one should decide upon a set of trade-offs at scheme selection phase.
Although in principle all three considered schemes are suitable to solve the master key sharing problem, it is not obvious which one would precisely yield the best trade-off between efficiency, security and functionality. For this reason, it is crucial to first define the relevant factors, then have a reliable set of benchmarks and salient features per schema as documented in the previous subsections.
We have identified the three following aspects, that in our experience generalize to several similar scenarios and thus constitute another contribution of this work: authorized subsets, integrity check and scheme efficiency. In the following, we study these features in the context of our use case.
Authorized Subsets. First we need to identify which secret sharing category (according to our categorization in section 2) can address our secret recovery scenario. Trusted parties need to define the recovery policy by answering: "Which parties are needed to recover the secret and under which conditions?". We conducted a set of interviews at Brainloop with the operation and security teams, along with managers, to answer this question. It turned out that a subgroup of a certain size of trusted parties should be able to recover the secret. Similarly, the main concern after preventing a collusion attack is to cope with failures and disasters such as share loss. If one party is not available or has lost her share, still an authentic set of the players can recover the secret. Subsequently, threshold schemes such as Shamir or Schoenmakers seem to be appropriate in this case. On the other hand, defining a complex set of users like in BenalohLeichter was not a desired functionality.
Share's Integrity Check. Some schemes lack verifiability of the shares' integrity, thus it is necessary to understand the importance of the verifiability in our use case. Here we question: "In what cases does the scheme security benefit from the share's integrity checks?". In Brainloop setting, since the master key is available on the server inside the secure storage, receiving tampered shares for secret reconstruction will automatically result in rejection of the shares. Thus, an extra integrity check is unnecessary.
Efficiency. Algorithm runtime complexity, usage frequency and integration costs are also playing an important role in scheme selection for industrial use cases. Our goal is to find the cheapest integration cost with the best performance. As a matter of fact, Shamir's scheme does not require further infrastructural supports such as PKI as opposed to Schoenmakers' scheme. Therefore, it is low cost and easy to integrate to the ongoing production system.
RELATED WORKS
Complexity-theoretical bounds of different secret sharing schemes are surveyed by (Beimel, 2011) . Also, applications of secret sharing as a primitive has been explored by many individual researchers for various sort of problems. (Hadavi et al., 2015) proposes a policy enforcement mechanism for outsourced data to untrusted servers using Shamir secret sharing and Chinese remainder theorem. Their protocol enforces access policies by spreading the over multiple servers. More on the multiparty computation ground, (Bogdanov et al., 2008 ) developed a secure multiparty computation framework based on additive secret sharing scheme. In addition to that, they actually prototyped a secure solution for Estonia tax fraud detection process based on their framework (Bogdanov et al., 2015) . In our case study we are given a situation that can leverage secret sharing security guar-antees. Since a secret is used to authorize securityrelated operations, we use secret sharing as a medium to grant actions when dealing with critical operations on a server.
CONCLUSION
Secret sharing can be used to solve challenging keymanagement issues (DSouza et al., 2011) . However, due to a lack of public implementations and unclear functionality, efficiency and security trade-offs, it has not found its way into industrial use cases.
Based on the example of Brainloop * we showed a concrete and generic architecture, using secret sharing, which securely perform critical operations as well as secret key redundancy.
We highlighted the different criteria that need to be taken into account for the secret sharing algorithm selection. To help selection we also carried out benchmarks over an open source .NET implementation (Ahmadvand, 2015) of three of the most prominent secret sharing schemes from the literature: Shamir, Benaloh-Leichter and Schoenmakers.
As part of future work, we would consider combining both custom access structure (non-threshold) and share integrity verification. For this purpose, Schoenmakers scheme can be modified to handle generalized access structures. Besides, it would be interesting to measure Schoenmakers' performance when elliptic curves are used.
